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Abstract: 
We study the effect of capital regulation on bank’s loan loss provisions. Using hand collected 
data on 13 Tunisian banks during the period 2006-2016, we show that Tunisian banks 
discretionnary decrease loan loss provisions under regulatory pressure. When studying private 
banks and public banks, we find that they don’t respond to the same capital regulatory 
constraints. Private banks discretionary reduce provisions in reaction to an increase in capital 
requirements when they are under pressure to meet regulatory eligible capital. However, the 
provisioning behavior of public banks is influenced by its regulatory capital position:  they take 
lower loan loss provisions to enhance capital positions through the year and higher levels of 
loans loss provisions when coming into the year with stronger capital positions. Our analyses 
indicate that Tunisian banks use discretionary capital management to appear to be better 
capitalized but their overall ability to absorb loan losses is reduced. Regulators must be aware 
of this association and are requested to further strengthen regulation in loan classification and 
provisioning.   
 
Keywords: Tunisian banks, capital ratios, eligible capital, capital management, loan loss 
provisions, capital regulatory pressure, discretionary loan loss provisions.  
 
 
 
 
Malika NEIFAR, 
Email:mneifar68@gmail.com 
Professor of statistics and Econometrics 
University of Sfax, Tunisia 
High Institute of Business Studies  
 
2 
 
I- INTRODUCTION 
The Tunisian banking system is characterized by limited profitability, inefficiency, low credit 
intermediation1, and significant vulnerabilities. The performance of the loan portfolio is very 
weak and increasingly causes a risk to the stability of the financial system. Tunisian banks, 
concerned about their profitability, increased their interest margins. As a result, borrowers were 
unable to repay the service of their debts. This has led to an accumulation of nonperforming 
loans (NPL). The weight of the NPL is heavy on the Tunisian banks. These loans were initially 
21 per cent over the 2002-2006 periods. Then, thanks to the reforms of the Central Bank, they 
reached 13.5 per cent of total credit in 2012 (Abid et al., 2015). However, Tunisian banks 
remain to be weakly provisioned and NPL continue to plumb the banking sector with a rate of 
16 per cent, the highest rate in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries in 2015 
(African Manager, 2016). They represent 17.8 per cent for public banks and 10.6 per cent for 
private banks (Kalfaoui and Ben Saâda, 2015).  These loans have increased both the volume of 
doubtful loans and the risk of insolvency.  
The reform of the Tunisian banking law2 was initiated since 2006 in order to strengthen 
regulation and corporate governance. The preoccupation of regulators was how to improve the 
solidity and liquidity of the Tunisian banking sector. The regulatory frameworks imposed upon 
Tunisian banks by the Circulars (91-243 and 99-04) as modified by subsequent circulars4 is 
widely inspired from the Basel I framework. It has strengthened banks’ capital positions to 
increase the resilience of banks and their ability to handle downturns. 
Previous research on the relation between capital regulation and bank’s economic behavior, 
documented that higher capitalized banks are better able to resist to potential financial crises. 
We extend this stream of research by investigating the change in accounting behavior made by 
banks in reaction to regulatory pressure imposed by bank capital regulation, known as the 
“regulatory capital management” hypothesis5.  
Loan loss provisions are accumulated in the allowance account to prevent banks from potential 
expected losses. The rules for how to account for loan losses in the Tunisian context are outlined 
by two different sources: (1) the circular n ° 91-24 and n°99-04 related to risk division and 
                                                          
1 34 percent of Tunisian firms report that access to finance is a major constraint to them (Bank World Report 2014) 
2 There were real efforts to prepare the adoption of Basel II framework and to converge towards international 
standards. 
3 In June 2012, the Circular (91-24) of the Central Bank of Tunisia strengthened some aspects of its supervision 
over the banking sector. 
4 See table 1 (in 2011, twice in 2012, twice in 2013, once in 2014 and once in 2015). 
5It is defined as thoughtful decisions made by banks in order to optimize capital structure for regulatory purposes. 
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coverage as modified by subsequent texts and (2) the Tunisian Accounting Standards, TAS 24. 
Eligible capital for regulatory purposes, including retained earnings and shareholder equity for 
examples, is necessary to preserve bank solvency in periods when the capital is hit by 
unexpected losses. When loan loss provisions are increased, they will reduce earnings before 
taxes on a dinars-for-dinars basis which eventually decrease eligible capital. We hypothesize 
that this link constitutes a strong incentive for banks to reduce loan loss provisions mainly when 
they are under regulatory pressure. Taking lower provisions will increase reserves of eligible 
capital to face unexpected losses but it will reduce the allowance account capacity to prevent 
banks from potential expected losses. When regulatory pressure motivates banks to reduce 
provisions to meet minimum regulatory levels of eligible capital, their risk-based capital ratios 
will improve whereas banks ‘overall capacity of coverage is reduced. Thus, a regulatory 
arbitrage of loan loss provisions is created. This arbitrage is allowed according to TAS 24 which 
encourages the management to rely on “experienced judgment” to assess the size of impairment 
losses. 
Unlike previous research by Taktak et al. (2010), who focused on the determinants of loan loss 
reserves of weakly provisioned Tunisian banks, our study seek to explain provisioning 
discretionary behavior under regulatory pressure.  
We investigate if Tunisian banks exercise discretion for regulatory purposes when accounting 
for loan losses based on data on 13 Tunisian banks during the period 2006-20166. The Tunisian 
financial sector is small and dominated by public-controlled banks but also presents a 
significant number of private banks. So, we investigate if higher capital requirements results in 
creating generally lower and potentially insufficient loan loss provisions to meet minimum 
levels in public and private banks.  
We find that Tunisian banks exercise discretion for regulatory purposes when creating loan loss 
provisions. They take lower provisions to enhance capital positions through the year and higher 
provisions when coming into the year with strong capital positions. Private and public banks 
respond to different capital regulatory pressure. While private banks discretionary reduce loan 
loss provisions to inflate eligible capital in reaction to increasing capital requirements in the 
future, public banks decrease their loan loss provisions under pressure to meet capital ratio 
levels through the year. Both of their capital positions will improve however their overall 
resilience to risk is reduced.  
                                                          
6 During the period of our study (2006-2016), bank regulation in the Tunisian context and prudential national rules 
for risk coverage are widely inspired from the Bale I framework. 
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Regulators must be aware of this association and are requested to further strengthen regulation 
in particular for loan classification and provisioning.   
I- Bank capital regulation  
There are three Basel Accords those have been governing banks over the last 30 years. 
During the pre-Basel era, banks used to assess their capital adequacy by the ratio between 
capital requirements and total assets. They also used to include the allowance account in the 
calculation of the eligible capital. This capital adequacy ratio was the top concern of the first 
Basel Accord (released in 1988). Basel I introduced a new framework to calculate the minimum 
capital ratio to better link capital with risk. Rules for computation of both numerator and 
denominator of such a ratio changed:  
-In the numerator, eligible capital levels are calculated based on both on- and off balance sheet 
risks. Tier I capital is at least comprised from 50% of the required capital. Tier II capital is 
formed from hybrid capital and subordinated debt. Banks’ eligible capital for regulatory 
purposes is constituted from Tier I- and Tier II capital.  
- In the denominator, risk-weighted assets replaced total assets. In order to calculate Risk-
weighted assets, it is assigned different risk-weights to different asset classes on the basis of the 
asset’s inherent risk.  
Furthermore, Tier I capital doesn’t include the allowance account for loan losses but this latter 
is included in Tier II capital only with a limit of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. 
 
According to Basel I, the minimum risk-based capital ratio required by banks by 1992 is 8%. It 
indicates the required level of capital a bank has to hold for a given level of risk-weighted assets. 
In 2006, the Basel II accord is introduced to revise the first accord and to further “strengthen 
the soundness and stability of the international banking system” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006, pp. 2-3) 7. During the time that the minimum risk-based capital ratio of 8% 
is extended, three related basis are introduced to enhance the framework’s sensitivity to risk. 
The first rule is related to the computation of internal risk-weights, and has an effect on banks’ 
capital requirements8. The second rule concerns the development of an adequate risk 
management processes to better monitor risks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
                                                          
7 For more details, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s publication, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A revised version, June 2006. 
8
 Risk-weighted assets are either calculated in accordance with the standardized approach, using risk-weights pre-
assigned by national authorities, or the internal ratings-based [IRB] approach, using internal models to determine 
risk-weights. 
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2006). The third rule introduces the regulatory disclosure requirements: banks are required to 
disclose annual risk and capital management reports.  
 
The Basel III accord was introduced in 2010 to improve the weaknesses of the existing 
framework, as well as to give responses to the global financial crisis. Its objective is to increase 
the resilience of the banking sector and individual banks’ ability to absorb losses (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). Basel III carries forward the three pillars from 
Basel II, with additional regulatory requirements to be gradually implemented over the period 
2013-2019. It increases both the quantity and the quality of eligible capital for regulatory 
purposes9. From another side, Basel III recommends prolonging the Basel I-floor through to 
2017, though this decision comes under national authorities. The reform of the Tunisian 
banking law was initiated since 2006 by the BCT in order to converge towards international 
standards. There were real efforts to prepare the adoption of Bale II framework.  Since the 
enforcement of the Internal Audit Circular of 2006-19, Article 25 provided the attribution of an 
internal rating system in line with that proposed by the Basel II. In 2016, the new law n° 2016-
48 of 11 July 2016 for banks and financial institutions was adopted10.  
During the period of our study (2006-2016), bank regulation in the Tunisian context and 
prudential national rules for risk coverage are widely inspired from the Bale I framework.  
II-The link between loan loss provisions and regulatory ratio in the Tunisian 
banking sector   
 
The minimum capital ratio is imposed by regulators who also give rules for how to calculate 
eligible capital and risk-weighted assets. Their preoccupation is how to increase the resilience 
of banks and their ability to handle unexpected losses.   
In this paper regulatory capital management is defined as considerate decisions made by banks 
to optimize capital structure for regulatory purposes. As the minimum capital ratio is set up by 
regulators, capital management includes decisions to increase the numerator (eligible capital) 
or to decrease the denominator (assets) of the risk-based capital ratio. The numerator can be 
                                                          
9
 Additionally, national authorities are given the choice to implement several capital buffers and to determine the 
appropriate size of these buffers based on domestic macroeconomic conditions. A minimum leverage ratio of 3% 
independent of risk, as well as two new liquidity ratios are also introduced (Greenbaum, Thakor, & Boot, 2016). 
10 Currently, Tunisian banks are required to comply with the new framework through the requirements of article 
16 of circular 2016-06 without exceeding the deadline of end of December 2017. 
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raised through equity issuances or a restrictive payout policy. The denominator can be 
decreased by changing the asset composition, securitizing loans, and decreasing lending.  
Indeed, varying or shifting the loan portfolio to reduce risk, yields more assets with lower risk-
weights. 
The rules for accounting for loan losses in the Tunisian context are outlined by two different 
sources: (1) the circular n ° 91-24 and n°99-04 related to risk division and coverage as modified 
by subsequent texts and (2) the Tunisian Accounting Standards, TAS 24 (as summarized in 
table 1 below):  
Table 1: Regulatory 
framework and rules for 
banking provisioning  
Reforms introduced 
1) CBT Rules 
 
Circulars n° 91-24 and n° 
99-04  
 
(Quantitative criteria are 
used to account for loan 
loss provisions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Two categories of assets are distinguished: Current assets 
and uncertain assets. The latter group is  decomposed into 
4 classes:  
- Class 1 is composed of assets which have to be closely 
observed due to industry’s difficulties of borrowers.  
- Classes 2, 3 and 4 include assets for witch a payment delay 
of respectively 90 days, 180 days and 360, is observed. 
Deficient borrowers are classified into one of the 
subsequent classes according to the duration of late 
payment.  
Default risk is only accounted for after the occurrence of a 
specific incident with regard to the credit quality of the 
debtor Only non-performing loans (class 2 to 4) which are 
overdue for more than 90 days can be provisioned. The rate 
of provision ranges from 20% for class 2 assets, 50% for class 
3, to 100% for class 4 assets. It also applies the contagion rule 
for classification of assets 4.  
 As modified by the subsequent circulars11 : 
 Circular no 2012-20 
of December 6, 2012 
 Collective provisions are necessary to cover latent risks on 
current commitments and commitments requiring specific 
monitoring. 
 Circular No. 2012-09 
of 29  June 2012, 
 gradual increase of the minimum solvency ratio to 9% for 
the end of 2013 and then to 10% starting from the end of 
2014 
 Instituting, from the end of 2014, of a core funds ratio (Tier 
1 ratio) of 6% for the end of 2013 and 7%. 
 Allowing banks, from the financial year 2013, to deduce 
from their core funds declared on an individual basis their 
shareholdings in other banks. 
 Constricting, from the end of 2013, the standards on major 
risks by decreasing the standard from fivefold to threefold 
of net core funds for incurred risks exceeding 5% of core 
                                                          
11 Subsequent circulars modifying circular n ° 91-24 introduced “quantitative requirements as regards risk 
management and coverage” and “Qualitative requirements in terms of governance and anti-money laundering 
and terrorism financing” 
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funds and the norm from 2 to 1.5 times of net core funds 
for incurred risks exceeding 15% of net core funds. 
 Reducing, from the end of 2013, the ceiling applied to 
incurred risks on related parties from 3 times to just one 
fold of net core funds 
 Circular No. 2013-21 
of 30 December 2013 
 New rules for additional provisioning according to the 
seniority of assets in class 412. 
 Circular No. 2014-14 
of 11 November 2014 
 Introduced a new liquidity ratio13 which is largely based on 
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio of Basel III.   
 BCT Circular No. 
2011-06 of 20 May 
2011 
 strengthening good governance rules in banks and 
financial institutions 
 BCT Circular No. 
2013-15 of 7 
November 2013 
 set up a comprehensive internal control system for the fight 
against money laundering based on the FATF 
recommendations to protect the banking sector against any 
abusive financial use 
 Exceptional measures  
 BCT circular No. 
2015-12 of 22 July 
2015 
 Exceptional measures to support enterprises operating in 
tourism sector   
 
2) Tunisian Accounting Standards: TAS 24 

 Tunisian Accounting 
Standards, TAS 2414 : 
(Qualitative criteria and 
the judgment of 
management are used to 
assess for loan loss 
provisions) 
 This specific law relies on an economic approach to 
calculate loan loss provisions. It assesses provisions on the 
basis of predicted probabilities of defaults without waiting 
for the effective default of the borrower. It provides a 
better level of the anticipated losses on loans. 
 
In accordance with TAS 24 (§25-26), loans are tested for objective evidence of impairment on 
both individual and collective level every reporting period. The valuation of commitments and 
the estimation of provisions are the judgments of management. It is essential that this judgment 
be based on the most likely assumptions and that it be applied consistently. In practice, Tunisian 
banks apply the provision rules set by CBT circulars and the exercise of management judgment 
is only allowed when assessing the amount of collective provisions or through the reporting of 
an internal memo in order to precise the rate of provisioning by class. Even though accounting 
supervisors seek to prevent management discretion being used for unwanted purposes, TAS 24 
is a principle-based standard. This means that management are encouraged to rely on 
“experienced judgment” when determining the size of impairment losses. However, by relying 
on experienced judgment, TAS 24 gives management incentives for discretionary accounting 
                                                          
12 As a result, this measure allowed improving the coverage ratio of nonperforming loans by provisions, up from 
45.7% at the end of 2012 to 56.9% at the end of 2015. 
13 This new ratio is able to identify the liquidity risk rather than the transformation risk and to take into account 
off-balance sheet commitments. 
14 Which is highly inspired from international standards 5 relying on an economic approach. 
8 
 
behavior. Discretionary management behavior could for instance be used to accumulate hidden 
reserves by generating too high provisions, or to improve capital position by minimizing 
provisions to raise eligible capital.  
Banks have to comply with both accounting and regulatory standards at a time. How the 
accounting for loan losses could influence eligible capital can be analyzed as capital 
management for regulatory purposes. Loans are subject to an impairment test of recognition 
and evaluation of individualized and collective provisions as required by TAS 24. If the 
existence of impaired value is determined on objective basis, the identification of NPL and the 
creation of provisions by the bank become an obligation in order to cover expected loan losses. 
The ability of the bank to stand these losses is enhanced by adding individual and collective 
provisions to the allowance account. Loan loss provisions are by definition an expense for 
which a one unit increase results in a one unit decrease of earnings before taxes. This component 
is included to eligible capital as Tier I denoting that loan loss provisions deflate Tier I capital 
on a (1-taxrate) basis. Moreover, a one unit increase in the accumulated loan loss provisions in 
the allowance account constitutes a one unit increase in Tier II capital, given that the Tier II 
quota of the allowance account is not exhausted (Tier II capital include up to 1.25% of risk-
weighted assets from the allowance account if banks apply the standardized method, and 0.6% 
if banks apply the IRB method). 
The direct effect of the variation of loan loss provisions on earnings and its indirect effect on 
eligible capital represent the regulatory tradeoff of loan loss provisions. 
   
Accumulated provisions in the allowance account together with eligible capital for regulatory 
purposes constitute the bank ability to cover from the risk of non-performing loans and losses. 
However, the level of loan loss provisions could be objective and sufficient to enhance the 
overall ability of the bank to cover losses in periods when banks are exposed to higher required 
capital pressure. 
If banks under pressure reduce their provisions to meet regulatory purposes, their risk-based 
capital ratios will improve while overall solidity is reduced. Banks appear to be better 
capitalized, but the overall capacity to bear expected and unexpected non performing loans is 
reduced.  
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IV Literature review and hypothesis development 
Regulatory pressure is exercised on banks by supervisory authorities every time that a higher 
risk-weight is applied, a higher minimum risk-based capital ratio is required or the structure of 
eligible capital is redefined.  
A bank has to hold a required level of eligible capital for a given level risk-weighted assets and 
a minimum risk-based capital ratio. This capital requirement could be affected by an increase 
of the regulatory pressure. Even though banks’ accounting decisions could not be generally 
influenced by regulatory pressure, the relation between loan loss provisions and eligible capital 
gives banks incentives to consider regulatory requirements when assessing for loan loss 
provisions. 
The capital management hypothesis has been tested under different regulatory frameworks as 
summarized in the table 2 below:  
 
Table 2. Summary of literature review 
Studies Results Context 
 
Pre-Basel studies: 
 
The enclosure of the 
allowance account in 
the eligible capital 
calculation gives 
banks incentives to 
exercise discretion to 
create higher loan 
loss provisions.  
 
 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), showed that, in 
response to regulation, low capitalized banks 
inflate capital levels and decrease risk exposure. 
Moyer (1990) found a negative link between 
excess capital and the amount of loan loss 
provisions. He explains that capital constrained 
banks created higher provisions to inflate eligible 
capital. 
Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995) found 
that accruals (such as loan loss provisions, loan 
charge-offs, and securities gains and losses) are 
jointly used for regulatory capital management 
purposes. They employ the primary capital ratio 
to test whether provisions are managed to inflate 
eligible capital when external sources of capital 
are costly, and find results similar to Moyer 
(1990). 
US Banks. 
 
Capital-
constrained 
banks in 
the US. 
 
US banks 
in the 
period 1987 
to 1989. 
 
Pre-Basel versus 
Post-Basel studies :  
Results from pre-
Basel versus post-
Basel studies 
indicate that loan 
loss provisions are 
still used for 
 
Kim and Kross (1998) find low capitalized banks 
to reduce loan loss provisions and increase loan 
write-offs in the post-Basel era compared to pre-
Basel. High capitalized banks exhibited no 
difference in accrual accounting across the 
regulatory regimes. Their findings infer that 
excluding the allowance account from the 
calculation of eligible capital changed banks’ 
provisioning behavior. 
US banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American 
Banks 
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regulatory capital 
management.  
Under the new risk-
based framework15, 
the incentives are 
reversed. Banks are 
under pressure to 
create lower 
provisions. 
Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999) test 
hypotheses of capital management, earnings 
management and signaling effects through loan 
loss provisions for the new capital adequacy 
regulations. They include the regulatory capital 
ratio and find that its relation to loan loss 
provisions is less negative in the post-Basel period. 
Post-Basel studies:  
 
Basel I better linked 
capital with risk, as 
banks were required 
to hold higher levels 
of eligible capital 
when risk-exposure 
increased. As the 
allowance account 
was limited in the 
calculation of 
eligible capital, 
banks’ incentives to 
use loan loss 
provisions for 
regulatory purposes 
changed. The trade-
off between eligible 
capital and loan loss 
provisions creates 
incentives for banks 
to reduce provisions. 
Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995) find that 
low capitalized banks reduced loan loss provisions 
after the allowance account was limited in the 
eligible capital calculation. 
 
Shrives and Dahl (2003) capital-constrained 
banks use discretion to reduce loan loss provisions 
if external funding is expensive. 
 
Cummings and Durrani (2014) investigate the 
effect of the Basel II accord on loan loss 
provisions. They find that banks use part of 
surplus capital to pre-fund future credit losses 
and create lower loan loss provisions when 
discretionary risk-weighted assets increase. 
 
Norden and Stoian (2014) tested earnings 
management and loan loss provisions from risk 
and profitability perspectives. They find loan loss 
provisions to be lower when discretionary risk-
weighted assets increase. 
In the US 
 
 
 
 
 Japanese 
banks  
 
 
In 
Australian 
banks in 
the period 
2004 to 
2012  
 
 
85 Dutch 
banks from 
1998 to 
2012. 
 
The minimum risk-based capital ratio is set by regulators. We choose changes in risk weighted 
assets (DRWAS) as a proxy for the variation in capital requirements through the year. If banks 
are confronted to an increase in capital requirements, lowering the amount of the provisions 
improves their risk based capital ratio. As a result, the numerator of the regulatory capital ratio 
fairly increases, so we hypothesize: 
H1: Banks will exercise discretion to reduce loan loss provisions when facing an increase in 
capital requirements through the year. 
We expect a negative coefficient on the changes in risk weighted assets if banks exercise 
discretion to decrease loan loss provisions when facing an increase in capital requirements. 
 
                                                          
15
 That excludes the allowance account from the calculation of eligible capital. 
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Requirements of higher capital in the future encourage banks to improve their capital position 
today. Prior to any additions from this year’s earnings, banks can take actions to increase the 
risk-based capital ratio through the year and their capital position can be improved. In order to 
study how changes in banks’ capital position through the year affect loan loss provisions, we 
utilize the end of year risk-based capital ratio adjusted for earnings, “AdjCap”, as a proxy for 
banks’ enhancement in capital position. We test if banks reduce loan loss provisions to increase 
eligible capital when they take actions to improve capital position through the year. We 
hypothesize:   
H2:  Banks will exercise discretion to reduce loan loss provisions when improving capital 
position through the year. 
 
We expect a negative coefficient on “AdjCap” if banks discretionary reduce loan loss 
provisions when improving capital position. 
 
We consider “BCap” as the risk-based capital ratio at the beginning of year in order to test if 
banks with higher ratios coming into the year create higher provisions. Coming into the year 
with a better capital position, should reduce bank incentives to discretionary manage provisions 
for regulatory purposes. We hypothesize alternatively:   
 
H3:  Banks with higher (lower) risk-based capital ratios coming into the year will exercise 
discretion to boost (reduce) loan loss provisions.   
 
We expect a positive coefficient on “BCap” if banks with higher regulatory capital ratios 
coming into the year use discretion to increase loan loss provisions and a negative coefficient 
if banks with lower regulatory capital ratios coming into the year use their discretion to reduce 
loan loss provisions. 
V- Data  
The Tunisian banking system consists of 18 universal banks, 2 banks specialized in microcredit 
and small and medium-sized businesses financing and 3 banks specialized in Islamic banking 
products16. The Tunisian State is presented as a reference shareholder in 7 banks (STB, BNA, 
BH, BTS, BFPME, BFT and BZ). 
                                                          
16 REPORT ON BANKING SUPERVISION 2015. 
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In this study, we use data on thirteen17 Tunisian banks over the period 2006 to 2016. These 
banks are listed in the Tunis Stock Exchange. We exclude specialized banks (3 Islamic banks 
and 2 micro-credits) from the data set in order to insure the comparability of accounting 
numbers. Accounting and financial data are derived from Bankscope database (December, 
2017). Data on non-performing loans, provisions’ rates and capital adequacy ratio data are 
obtained from the CBT database.  
To our knowledge, no prior research has applied Tunisian bank data on the trade-off between 
loan loss provisions and bank capital regulation. In this respect, our study will be an important 
contribution to existing literature on bank regulation and capital management. 
VI- Methodology 
We construct a model inspired by Wahlen (1994) and Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999) to 
explain banks’ discretionary behavior with respect to loan loss provisions. In order to separate 
the discretionary loan loss provisions from the nondiscretionary component, Wahlen (1994) 
uses a two-stage loan loss expectations model. We adjust for the model of unexpected changes 
in loan loss provisions as applied by Wahlen (1994) from an investor’s view to better reflect 
bank behavior. In order to analyze discretionary loan loss provisions, we utilize a regression 
model similar to Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1990). We introduce capital variables to capture 
the discretionary behavior of provisioning under regulatory pressure. Then, we control for non-
discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions. This approach is less restrictive than a two-
stage model (Beatty and Liao, (2014)) because it is uncertain whether non-discretionary 
variables are free of discretionary influence. Following prior related research, we adopt an 
income statement view to examine the impact of regulations on annual loan loss provisions 
similar to Wahlen (1994)18.   
VI-1- Analyses of the impact of regulations on loan loss provisions   
a- The dependant variable  
Loan loss provisions are modeled using an income statement regression. This regression 
explains the determinants of loan loss provisions by discretionary capital variables and controls 
for non-discretionary variables. The dependent variable LLP is defined as this year’s loan loss 
                                                          
17 18- (3+2) = 13 
18 A two-stage balance sheet approach similar to Beaver and Engel (1996) can be used to test the robustness of 
our results. 
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provisions scaled by average loans. It measures net provisions in year t for bank i. The one stage 
regression model is defined as follows: 
 𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝑫𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜸𝟒𝑫𝑹𝑾𝑨𝑺𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜸𝟓𝑨𝒅𝒋𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕 
        + 𝜸𝟔𝑩𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜸𝟕𝑵𝑰𝑩𝑷𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                                                                          (1) 
 
We introduce the following variables in model (1) to examine loan loss provisions in Tunisian 
banks.  
b- Independent discretionary variables  
The relation between regulatory capital management and discretionary loan loss provisions is 
tested using the three flowing variables. DRWAS is defined as this year’s change in risk-
weighted assets scaled by assets end of year. It is used as a proxy for the change in banks’ 
regulatory capital requirements like Norden and Stoian (2014). It is expected to have a negative 
coefficient to confirm H1.  
We also introduce two capital ratio variables to assess if banks’ capital positions motivate the 
use of discretionary provisions for loan losses. AdjCap represents eligible capital adjusted for 
this year’s provisions, scaled by end of year risk-weighted assets. It is a proxy for the bank 
capital position which can be improved by adjusting the numerator or the denominator. It allows 
to assess if banks those improve capital position through the year, also utilize discretionary loan 
loss provisions19 to increase earnings. If so, it is expected to have a negative coefficient and H2 
can be confirmed.  
Like Ahmed et al., (1999), we introduce BCap to examine how capital ratios coming into the 
year influences provisioning behavior. BCap is defined as eligible capital coming into the year, 
scaled by risk-weighted assets beginning of year. Better capitalized banks comes into the year 
with higher risk-based capital ratios, thus have fewer incentives to use loan loss provisions to 
improve their capital position. Weakly capitalized banks come into the year with lower risk-
based capital ratios, hence with strong incentives to discretionary reduce loans loss provisions 
and inflate eligible capital. A positive (negative) coefficient on BCap would confirm alternative 
hypothesis H3, that banks use discretion to create higher (lower) provisions when capital ratios 
coming into the year are higher (lower).  
                                                          
19 Or use their discretion to reduce 
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c- Non-discretionary variables  
To control for the determinants of the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions, we 
introduce four additional variables in model (1):  Loans is defined as end of year gross loans 
scaled by average assets. NPL reflects end of year nonperforming loans to average loans, while 
DNPL is defined as one-year-ahead change in nonperforming loans as a fraction of end of year 
loans. NIBP is defined as net income before provisions scaled by end of year assets. These 
variables allow us to accurately investigate whether and how banks exercise capital 
management discretion for regulatory purposes.  
Among, non-discretionary variables introduced in equation (1) Loans are considered to reflect 
default risk in the loan portfolio not captured by NPL. According to Beaver and Engel (1996) 
and Kim and Kross (1998) there is a significant relation between Loans (or the size of the loan 
portfolio) and allowances and provisions for loan losses. Loans are expected to have positive 
coefficient. NPL reflects non-performing loans as loans more than 90 days overdue. It is an 
important indicator of default risk (Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson (1989)) and of losses 
coming soon. An increase in non-performing loans should create higher loan loss provisions. 
So, NPL are expected to have a positive coefficient.  Similar to Beaver and Engel (1996), DNPL 
is used as a proxy for the information about the quality of the loan portfolio in time t, not 
included in NPL. If this information is reflected in this year’s provisions, management increase 
provisions today to account for future deterioration of the loan portfolio. So we expect DNPL 
to have a positive coefficient. 
In addition to non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions, we include NIBP to 
control for the influence of earnings on loan loss provisions. Prior research by Ahmed, Takeda, 
and Thomas (1999) include this variable to test for earnings management through loan loss 
provisions. Wall and Koch (2000) suggest that income smoothing behavior may result from 
regulatory constraints. Managers take higher provisions in good periods and lower provisions 
in downturns. Accordingly, Fonseca and Gonzales (2008) suggest that income smoothing can 
improve the risk perception of a bank for its regulators and supervisors. Empirically, Omri et 
al. (2007) find a significant relation between loan loss provisions and earnings management for 
a panel of Tunisian banks. Under the income smoothing hypothesis, we would expect a positive 
relationship between NIBP and loan loss provisions. 
Table 1 reports the definition of variables. 
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Table 3: Definition of Variables 
LLP Loan loss provisions for bank i in year t to average loans 
Loans Gross loans for bank i in year t scaled by average assets 
NPL Non-performing loans to average loans 
DNPL One-year-ahead change in non-performing loans to loans end of year 
DRWAS The change in risk-weighted assets to assets 
AdjCap The end of year risk-based capital ratio adjusted for this year’s provisions 
BCap The risk-based capital ratio coming into the year. 
NIBP Earnings before taxes and provisions scaled by assets 
 
VI-2- Robustness analyses of the discretionary component of LLP   
 
We apply an additional model suggested by Wahlen (1994) and Norden and Stoian (2014) in 
order to test the robustness of our results. We estimate the non-discretionary component of loan 
loss provisions, NLLP, before defining the discretionary component of loan loss provisions, 
DLLP, as the difference between the actual loan loss provisions and the estimated non-
discretionary component. We define the non-discretionary provisions for loan losses as follows:   
 𝑵𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 +  𝝁𝒊,𝒕                                                (2) 
 
NLLP is defined as the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions scaled by average 
loans. The definitions and predicted signs on the coefficient of the explanatory variables are 
similar to those of the main model in equation (1). As NLLP cannot be examined directly, we 
regress LLP on the explanatory variables in equation (2) in order to estimate NLLP: 
 𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                                (3) 
 
Where, 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 =  𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 +  𝝁𝒊,𝒕. If the explanatory variables in equation (2) are free of discretion, 
the error term u will be zero, and we estimate DLLP without error. As LLP consists of both a 
non-discretionary and a discretionary component, the discretionary loan loss provisions are by 
definition: 
 𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 =  𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑵𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕                                                                                                 (4) 
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We regress DLLP on discretionary capital variables in order to test our hypotheses on regulatory 
capital management. Similar to the main model, we include an earnings variable to control for 
potential impact of earnings levels on provisioning behavior. Following previous studies, we 
consider EBTP to reflect discretionary behavior. The predicted signs on the coefficients of the 
variables are similar to those of equation (1). The second-stage regression is defined as follows: 
 𝑫𝑳𝑳𝑷𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑹𝑾𝑨𝑺𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝒅𝒋𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑩𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑵𝑰𝑩𝑷𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒊,𝒕           (5) 
VII- Results  
VII- 1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables. A Pearson correlation matrix of the 
same variables is presented in Table 5.  
Loan loss provisions scaled by average loans have a mean (median) equal to 1.4% (0.9%). The 
IMF20 reports of Tunisia 2002 and 2006 showed similar annual levels of loan loss provisions to 
total assets. Ahmed and al. (1999) find loan loss provisions to constitute 0.8% (0.5%) of average 
loans for American banks in the period 1987 to 1995. Studying banks across 40 countries, 
Fonseca and González (2008) find loan loss provisions to constitute 1.1% (0.5%) of assets 
beginning of year in the period 1995 to 2002. Our sample of Tunisian banks is thus comparable 
to previous studies on loan loss provisions. Non-performing loans equal 17% (13.5%) of 
average loans, while the one-year-ahead change in non-performing loans are -0.6% (-0.7%) of 
end of year loans.  
 
VII-2 Regression results from the main model  
 
Results from the main model are reported in Table 5. Coefficients of all the discretionary capital 
variables are not consistent. DRWAS is insignificant with the opposite predicted sign.  This 
finding is opposite to hypothesis H1, stating banks create lower loan loss provisions in periods 
of increasing capital requirements.  
 
                                                          
20 See IMF reports 2002 and 2006. 
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Table 4: Variable descriptive statistics during the period 2006-2016 
This table shows descriptive statistics for main variables. LLP is loan loss provisions to average loans. Loans 
are loans to average assets. NPL is non-performing loans to average loans, while DNPL is the one-year-
ahead change in non-performing loans to loans end of year. DRWA is the change in risk-weighted assets to 
assets. AdjCap is the end of year risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions, while BCap is the risk-based 
capital ratio coming into the year. NIBP is net income before provisions scaled by assets. 
 
 N MEAN MEDIAN SD 10% 90% 
LLP 131 0,014 0,009 0,0149 0,0004 0,029 
Loans 131 0,711 0,718 0,467 0,109 1,356 
NPL 112 0,170 0,135 0,105 0,081 0,314 
DNPL 101 -0,006 -0,0073 0,042 -0,037 0,039 
DRWAS 101 0,006 0,002 0,018 -0,005 0,030 
AdjCap 129 0,152 0,114 0,111 0,086 0,28 
BCap 113 0,140 0,106 0,110 0,077 0,275 
NIBP 125 0,0242 0,0248 0,007 0,014 0,032 
Table 4’- Correlation matrix 
 LLP Loans NPL DNPL DRWAS AdjCap BCap NIBP 
LLP 1        
Loans 0.7961* 1       
NPL 0.5159* 0.3013* 1      
DNPL 0.2235* 0.1893 0.0307 1     
DRWAS 0.3529* 0.2916* 0.1962 0.777* 1    
AdjCap -0.3532* -0.423* -0.3359* 0.249* 0.1166 1   
BCap -0.4651* -0.4701* -0.3846* 0.1398 0.005 0.8450* 1  
NIBP -0.1667 -0.1946 -0.2886* -0.0530 -0.168 -0.1450 -0.1214 1 
  
Both of the risk-based capital ratio variables are however significant with predicted signs on 
the coefficients. AdjCap is significant at 1% level, supporting hypothesis H2. A 1% increase 
in risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions constitutes a 17.2% decrease in loan loss 
provisions. BCap tests if banks with higher risk-based capital ratios coming into the year 
exercise discretion to create higher loan loss provisions. The variable is positive and significant 
at 1%, supporting that a 1% higher risk-based capital ratio coming into the year constitutes an 
12% increase in loan loss provisions.  
The signs on the coefficients of the non-discretionary control variables are in line with the 
predictions, though the variables are of varying significance. Coefficients on Loans are positive 
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Table 5- Regression results from the main model 
 
This table shows regressions of loan loss provisions during the period 2006-2016 on Tunisian banks. We report 
coefficients (p-values in parenthesis) from our Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS, Random Effects and Dynamic Fixed 
Effects regressions. The dependent variable, LLP, is loan loss provisions to average loans. Loans is loans to 
average assets. NPL is non-performing loans to average loans, while DNPL is the oneyear-ahead change in 
non-performing loans to loans end of year. DRWA is the change in risk-weighted assets to assets. AdjCap is the 
end of year risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions, while BCap is the risk-based capital ratio coming 
into the year. NIBP is net income before provisions scaled by assets. LLPt-1 is the lagged dependent variable. 
Standard errors are clustered on bank level. One, two, or three asterisks mean that the coefficients are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.    
 
 Predicted 
sign  
(1) 
LLP 
(2) 
LLP 
(3) 
LLP 
(4) 
LLP 
Loans  
+ 
0.007 
(0.101) 
0.016** 
(0.002) 
0.010** 
(0.010) 
0,012*** 
(0,000) 
 
NPL + 0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
0,046*** 
(0,000) 
 
DNPL + 0.078** 
(0.009) 
0.071** 
(0.004) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0,103*** 
(0,000) 
 
DRWAS - 0.031 
(0.702) 
0.082 
(0.426) 
0.046 
(0.593) 
0,024 
(0,826) 
 
AdjCap - -0.172*** 
(0.000) 
-0.152*** 
(0.001) 
-0.167*** 
(0.000) 
-0,159*** 
(0,000) 
 
BCap + 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.126*** 
(0.000) 
0.118*** 
(0.000) 
0,140*** 
(0,000) 
 
NIBP + 0.419** 
(0.015) 
0.161 
(0.235) 
0.288* 
(0.066) 
0,139 
(0,250) 
 
LLPt-1     0,250** 
(0,015) 
 
Model 
Specification   
 Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
Dynamic 
RE 
R2  0.69 0.76 0.73 0,78 
SE clustered 
on bank 
 Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  99 99 99 99 
Regression (1), (2), (3): 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐷𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾6𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾7𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Regression (4) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐷𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾6𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾7𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
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and significant at 5% and 1% level, suggesting that an increase in the lending activity of banks 
entail higher loss exposure, and thus loan loss provisions. The size of the loans portfolio is 
regarded when determining the level of loan loss provisions in Tunisian banks. NPL is 
significant at 1% with the predicted sign on the coefficient. This result emphasizes non-
performing loans as a nondiscretionary determinant of loan loss provisions. Keeping all other 
factors constant, a 1% increase in non-performing loans will increase provisions for loan losses 
by 7%. This result is similar to findings of Wahlen (1994), Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen 
(1995) and Kim and Kross (1998). DNPL is significant at 5% and 1% level, indicating that 
bank managers’ knowledge on future quality of loans (not included in NPL) is reflected in loan 
loss provisions. This suggests that all information on loan quality explains loan loss provisions 
in Tunisian banks, consistent with findings of Beaver and Engel (1996).  
 
Testing various lags and specifications of explanatory variables could provide insights into 
whether other nondiscretionary elements better explain loan loss provisions in our sample.   
NIBP is of varying significance, indicating that higher earnings levels do not always constitute 
higher levels of loan loss provisions. This result is consistent with the finding of Ahmed, 
Takeda, and Thomas (1999) on American banks.  
 
The main model provides significant coefficients with expected signs, except for the variables 
DRWAS and NIBP. The findings are robust to various specifications. We don’t confirm our 
first hypothesis that Tunisian banks use discretion to reduce loan loss provisions to inflate 
eligible capital for regulatory purposes in reaction to an increase in capital requirements. 
Nevertheless, we find evidence that (1) Tunisian banks improve their capital position through 
the year by creating lower provisions and (2) those coming into the year with stronger capital 
position create higher levels of loan loss provisions. The coefficients on the discretionary capital 
variables are consistent across the pooled OLS-, RE-, and dynamic model.  
VII-3 Regression results of discretionnary loan loass provisions  
 
Results from the robustness analyses are reported in Table 6. Results examining non-
discretionary loan loss provisions are reported in Panel A. Similar to the main model, Loans is 
positive and significant at 5% and 1% level. NPL is significant and positive at 5% and 1%. A 
1% increase in non-performing loans constitutes an increase in non-discretionary loan loss 
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provisions of 7%. This finding is fairly similar to that of the main model. Consistent with the 
main model, DNPL is significant, though only marginally at 5%. The coefficient is positive, 
indicating that management use knowledge about future quality of the loan portfolio when 
determining loan loss provisions. A 1% increase in one-year-ahead change in non-performing 
loans constitutes a 9% increase in non-discretionary loan loss provisions.  
 
Results examining discretionary loan loss provisions are reported in Panel B. Similar to the 
main model DRWAS is not significant at any conventional level. This indicates that the change 
in risk-weighted assets is of no importance when determining for loan loss provisions.   
Both of the risk-based capital ratio variables are however significant with predicted signs on 
the coefficients. AdjCap is negative and significant at 5% and 1% level, supporting hypothesis 
H2. A 1% increase in risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions constitutes a discretionnary 
reduction of 10% of loan loss provisions. This finding suggests that banks exercise discretion 
to reduce loan loss provisions when improving capital position through the year. BCap is 
positive and significant at 1%, supporting that a 1% higher risk-based capital ratio coming into 
the year constitutes a discretionnary increase of 9% of loan loss provisions. NIBP is positive 
and significant at 1% level, indicating that earnings levels influence discretionnary loan loss 
provisions, which is consistent with the smoothing hypothesis and corroborates previous studies 
(e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2004 for US banks; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003 for banks operating 
in OECD countries and Omri et al., 2007 and Taktak et al., 2010 for Tunisian banks21). 
 
We confirm that Tunisian banks exercise discretion for regulatory purposes when creating loan 
loss provisions. More precisely, prior to any additions from this year’s earnings, they 
discretionnary reduce loan loss provisions in order to increase the risk-based capital ratio 
through the year and enhance their capital position. However, banks coming into the year with 
stronger capital position create higher levels of loan loss provisions. We conclude that under 
regulatory constraints, managers behave opportunistically. They take higher provisions in 
presence of strong capital positions and lower provisions to face low capital positions coming 
into the year. Consequently, discretionary income smoothing behavior appears as a result from 
regulatory constraints (Wall and Koch, 2000).  
 
                                                          
21 They found that for Tunisian banks, earnings smoothing practices are an important driver of loan loss provisions. 
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Table 6 - Regression results of discretionary LLP 
This table shows two-stage regressions of loan loss provisions during the period 2006-2016 on Tunisian 
banks. We report coefficients (p-values in parenthesis) from our Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS, and Random 
Effects regressions. Panel A shows the first-stage regression results. The dependent variable, LLP, is loan 
loss provisions to average loans. Loans is loans to average assets. NPL is non-performing loans to average 
loans, while DNPL is the one-year-ahead change in non-performing loans to loans end of year. 
Panel B shows the second-stage regression results. The dependent variable, DLLP, is discretionary loan loss 
provisions to average loans. DRWA is the change in risk-weighted assets to assets. AdjCap is the end of year 
risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions, while BCap is the risk-based capital ratio coming into the 
year. NIBP is net income before provisions scaled by assets. Standard errors are clustered on bank level. 
One, two, or three asterisks mean that the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Regression of non discretionary LLP 
 (1) 
LLP 
(2) 
LLP 
(3) 
LLP 
Loans 0.008** 
(0.023) 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
 
NPL 0.082** 
(0.008) 
0.065*** 
(0.001) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
 
DNPL 0.085** 
(0.040) 
0.104** 
(0.023) 
0.095** 
(0.014) 
 
NIBP 0.420* 
(0.089) 
0.175 
(0.261) 
0.237 
(0.165) 
 
Model Specification   
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Random Effects 
R2 0.60 0.68 0.67 
SE clustered on bank Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 99 99 99 
First-stage regression: 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Panel B: Regression of discretionary LLP 
 (1) 
DLLP 
(2) 
DLLP 
(3) 
DLLP 
DRWAS -0.050 
(0.488) 
0.006 
(0.925) 
-0.028 
(0.684) 
 
AdjCap -0.114** 
(0.003) 
-0.090** 
(0.006) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
 
BCap 0.086*** 
(0.001) 
0.089*** 
(0.001) 
0.091*** 
(0.000) 
 
NIBP 0.695*** 
(0.001) 
0.381* 
(0.060) 
0.487*** 
(0.011) 
 
Model Specification   
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Random Effects 
R2 0.15 0.20 0.18 
SE clustered on bank Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 99 99 99 
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Second-stage regression: 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 
VII-4 Regression results : public versus private banks 
 
We perform two additional analyses to compare between the discretionary behaviors of public 
banks versus private ones in using loan loss provisions for regulatory purposes.  
Results examining discretionary loan loss provisions of private banks are reported in Panel 1. 
Inconsistently with the main model, DRWAS is significant at 5% and 1% levels with a negative 
coefficient. Keeping all other factors constant, this result suggests that a 1% increase in the 
change in risk-weighted assets constitutes a discretionary reduction in loan loss provisions of 
17.7%. This finding confirm hypothesis H1, stating private banks create lower loan loss 
provisions in periods of increasing capital requirements. Neither of the capital ratio variables 
AdjCap nor BCap, are significant at any conventional level. This indicates that, for private 
banks, capital position coming into the year and improvements in capital positions during the 
year are of no importance when determining loan loss provisions. 
NIBP is positive and significant with varying levels (10%, 5%, 1%), indicating that earnings 
levels influences discretionnary loan loss provisions. This finding is consistent with the 
smoothing hypothesis and corroborates previous studies of Omri et al., (2007) and Taktak et 
al., (2010) for Tunisian banks. Our study suggests that discretionary income smoothing 
behavior may be as a result from regulatory constraints (Wall and Koch, 2000).  
Results examining discretionary loan loss provisions of public banks are reported in Panel 2. 
Consistent with the main model, we find no indication of DRWAS influencing loan loss 
provisions at any conventional level. However, both of the risk-based capital ratio variables are 
significant with predicted signs on the coefficients. AdjCap is negative and significant at 5% 
and 1% level, supporting hypothesis H2. A 1% increase in risk-based capital ratio adjusted for 
provisions constitutes a discretionnary reduction of 12.3% of loan loss provisions. This finding 
suggests that public banks exercise discretion to reduce loan loss provisions when improving 
capital position through the year. BCap is positive and significant at 5% and 1% levels,  
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Table 7- Regression results: private versus public banks 
 
This table shows the regression results respectively for private banks (Panel 1) and for public banks (Panel2). 
The dependent variable, DLLP, is discretionary loan loss provisions to average loans. DRWAS is the change 
in risk-weighted assets to assets. AdjCap is the end of year risk-based capital ratio adjusted for provisions, 
while BCap is the risk-based capital ratio coming into the year. NIBP is net income before provisions scaled 
by assets. Standard errors are clustered on bank level. One, two, or three asterisks mean that the coefficients 
are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Panel 1: Regression results of discretionary LLP for private banks 
 
 (1) 
DLLP 
(2) 
DLLP 
(3) 
DLLP 
DRWAS -0.177** 
(0.003) 
-0.138** 
(0.007) 
-0.172*** 
(0.000) 
 
AdjCap 0.037 
(0.396) 
0.059 
(0.380) 
0.043 
(0.261) 
 
BCap -0.030 
(0.478) 
-0.019 
(0.772) 
-0.022 
(0.590) 
 
NIBP 0.641** 
(0.002) 
0.253* 
(0.097) 
0.493*** 
(0.000) 
 
Model Specification   
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Random Effects 
R2 0.18 0.25 0.21 
SE clustered on bank Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 72 72 72 
Second-stage regression: 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
Panel 2: Regression results of discretionary LLP for public banks 
 
 (1) 
DLLP 
(2) 
DLLP 
(3) 
DLLP 
DRWAS 0.122 
(0.396) 
0.140 
(0.305) 
0.140 
(0.172) 
 
AdjCap -0.136** 
(0.039) 
-0.123** 
(0.040) 
-0.123*** 
(0.000) 
 
BCap 0.091** 
(0.004) 
0.092** 
(0.008) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
 
NIBP 0.645 
(0.195) 
0.854 
(0.132) 
0.854** 
(0.013) 
 
Model Specification   
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Random Effects 
R2 0.536 0.547 0.547 
SE clustered on bank Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 27 27 27 
 
24 
 
Second-stage regression: 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
 
supporting that a 1% higher risk-based capital ratio coming into the year constitutes a 
discretionnary increase of 9.2% of loan loss provisions. Public banks coming into the year with 
a higher risk-based capital ratio, are not regulatory constrained and allow themselves to 
discretionnary increase their loan loss provisions, while those constrained to improve their 
capital position through the year, exercice their discretion to reduce loan loss provisons and 
their overall resilience to risk is reduced. 
Unlikely to private banks who discretionary decrease loan loss provisions to inflate eligible 
capital in reaction to increasing capital requirements in the future, public banks reduce 
discretionary loan loss provisions in order to increase the risk-based capital ratio through the 
year to enhance their capital position. While private banks focus on meeting long term capital 
requirements, public banks focus on managing short term levels of the risk capital ratios. 
Conclusion  
We conclude that, capital regulation exercises strong pressures on Tunisian banks to 
discretionary reduce loan loss provisions to meet capital ratios and capital requirements levels. 
Even though banks’ accounting decisions could not be generally influenced by regulatory 
pressure, the relation between loan loss provisions and eligible capital gives banks strong 
incentives to consider regulatory requirements when assessing for loan loss provisions. 
 
Our findings argue that under regulatory constraints, Tunisian banks behave opportunistically 
when assessing for loan loss provisions. They take lower provisions to enhance capital positions 
through the year and take higher provisions when coming into the year with strong capital 
positions. Their focus to meet regulatory constraints results in an income smoothing behavior 
as argued by Wall and Koch, (2000).  
Robustness checks show that both private banks and public banks exercise discretion for 
regulatory purposes when determining loan loss provisions. However, they react to different 
capital regulatory pressure. Private banks reduce discretionary loan loss provisions to inflate 
their eligible capital in reaction to increasing capital requirements in the future. This behavior 
also allows them to increase their earnings. Their capital requirements will improve while their 
overall resilience to risk is reduced. 
The provisioning behavior of public banks is influenced by its regulatory capital position:  they 
take lower loan loss provisions to enhance capital positions through the year and higher levels 
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of loans loss provisions when coming into the year with stronger capital positions. This 
behavior deteriorates their overall capacity to handle unexpected losses even though their risk-
capital ratio is met. When public banks come into the year with higher risk-based capital ratios 
they take a short time advantage to discretionary increase loan loss provisions as they are 
weakly provisioned.  
 
Results highlighted in this study are inconsistent with the preoccupation of regulators in aiming 
to increase the resilience of weakly provisioned banks. Regulators must be aware of the serious 
effect of capital management practice on the bank overall solidity. They are requested to find 
the way to supervise the scope of the discretionary use of provisions to manipulate capital 
position or to further strengthen regulation in particular for loan classification and provisioning.   
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